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Abstract 
Traditionally, economic literature has treated macroeconomic 
theory separately from the evolution of the microeconomic structure. 
However, the structure of the economy cannot be explained in terms 
only of macro factors or only of micro factors since each has a major 
influence on the other. It is important, therefore, to develop a greater 
linkage between the two in order to arrive at a better understanding of 
the interactions between macro factors and the microeconomic 
structure, especially the links between changes in macroeconomic 
policy and entrepreneurial decisions and firm behavior. This paper 
explores the macro policy-micro behavior nexus in a Latin American 
context in the textile goods market. 
The first section of the paper is an overview of the 
macroeconomic environment of Chile during the second half of the 
20th century. Its focus is on economic and commercial policy because 
of the importance that trade barriers and exchange rates are thought to 
have for the performance of the manufacturing sector. The second 
section explores the evolution of Chile`s textile and garment sector 
which is the sector that has been selected for study. The last section is 
a case study describing the response and behavior of a leading textile 
firm, throughout its history, in Chile. 





Traditionally, economic literature has treated macroeconomic 
theory separately from the evolution of the microeconomic structure. 
The relationship that exists between them has not been explained to 
any considerable extent mainly because of the limitations that 
conventional price theory imposes. As Katz (1996) points out, current 
macroeconomic theory posits that a firm maximizes its utility in a 
context where it is assumed that there is no reason for its conduct to 
differ from any of its competitors. Their relationship occurs through 
the price system and competition is the only disciplinary factor in the 
conduct of individual firms. 
In fact, firms differ in their strategies and structural organization 
as well as in the technological capacities that they acquire during their 
lifetime. Many decisions that are taken at the microeconomic level are 
fairly independent of the macroeconomic context. They mainly follow 
certain routines that have to be carried out and usually respond or 
depend only on certain aggregate prices in the economy. These actions 
are part of the routine of doing business and are carried out because 
they are things that must be done and they are maintained because they 
are hard and costly to change.  
However, when macroeconomic turbulence and uncertainties 
reach a crisis level, even the most elementary routines may have to be 
abandoned and when that happens, major macroeconomic disequilibria 
will affect the actions of economic agents. In fact, once the growing 
imbalance brings about changes in decisions concerning, for example, 
the   use   of     technology   and   the     rationale   for   innovation  and  
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transformation within firms, one can expect that the micro structure in which these decisions are 
made will be fundamentally changed.  
The structure of the economy cannot be explained in terms only of macro factors or only of 
micro factors since each has an influence on the other. It is important, therefore, to develop a 
greater linkage in economic analysis between the two in order to arrive at a better understanding of 
the interactions between macro factors and the microeconomic structure, especially the effect of 
changes in macroeconomic policy on entrepreneurial decisions and firm behavior.  
This paper explores the macro influence on the micro behavior in a Chilean context in textile 
goods. Chile is a small economy relative to many of its large competitors and trading partners and 
the United States economy has a particularly strong influence on Chile’s macro economy. Chile’s 
textile industry is small and so it is doubly vulnerable to changes in macroeconomic and trade 
policies with major competitors such as China. It is essential that the business community and 
entrepreneurs have a fundamental understanding of the effects of economic policies on their 
business. The recent impact of commodity prices, particularly copper prices, on the exchange rate 
of the Chilean peso is a case in point. 
The first section of the paper is an overview of the macroeconomic environment of Chile during 
the second half of the 20th century. Its focus is on economic and commercial policy because of the 
importance that trade barriers and exchange rates are thought to have for the performance of the 
manufacturing sector. It then explores the evolution of Chile`s textile and garment sector which is 
the sector that has been selected for study. The last section is a case study describing the behavior 
of a leading textile firm, throughout its history, in Chile, a firm that was born in the early 1950's 
and continues to survive today despite the major macroeconomic changes that have occurred in 
Chile in the last fifty years. The paper describes how this particular firm has responded and adapted 
to and survived the changes in macroeconomic policies. This is a considerable achievement 
considering that, after the general liberalization of the economy, the country lacks any competitive 
advantage in manufacturing activities in this sector. 
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II. The macroeconomic environment 
Chile's economic history in the 20th century can be divided into two 
main periods. Prior to 1973, a 40-year-long import substitution strategy 
marked the structure and performance of the economy. After the military 
coup in 1973 a general free market approach governed policies, 
introducing trade liberalization reform along with a reordering of the 
public finances, massive privatizations, and a new labour institutional 
framework. These reforms that started in the mid-70s through to the 80s 
were thoroughly institutionalized and survived the debt crisis of 1982 and 
the transition back to democracy in 1990 (Larrain and Vergara, 2001).  
1. Economic policies 
It is interesting to observe the dramatic difference in economic 
policies that existed before and after 1973 in Chile. Trade policy is an 
area that illustrates this difference. Though commercial considerations 
and the comparative advantages of countries with regards to trade have 
always occupied a central position in the overall design of Chile`s 
policies, the way that these have been defined has changed 
considerably. 
For much of  the 20th century there was a consensus in 
developing countries that the best trade policy for development was a 
policy known as Import Substitution as the path to Industrialization 
(ISI). This meant that the production of import—competing goods 
should be promoted and expanded to satisfy the domestic market 
through incentives up to whatever level of import restrictions was 
needed, including outright import prohibition. 
Macroeconomic policies, sector performance and firm response: the case of  Chile’s textile goods market 
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It was thought that import substitution in manufactures was synonymous with 
industrialization, which was seen as the key to development. Today, by contrast, it is considered 
that growth is enhanced through an outwardly oriented trade regime with fairly uniform incentives, 
often functioning mainly through exchange rates, for the production of both exporting and import-
competing goods (Kruger, 1997). 
The ideological turnabout came with the exhaustion of the ISI strategy. One of the main 
problems of the past protectionist policies was that they generally ended up being arbitrary. They 
were used for private interests, which did not bring social benefits and resulted in industrial 
structures that were not competitive at an international level and were ultimately dependent on 
governmental protection for their survival (Ffrench-Davis, 1999). It is, nevertheless, important to 
point out that the gross national product growth rate and the improvement in the standard of living 
were particularly rapid during this period (1950-1980) but the ISI policy needed to be restructured. 
The new open market ideology and policy recommendations represent in effect a simple 
version of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model which encourages a trajectory like the one 
followed by Chile: indiscriminate trade liberalization. This ideology predicates that the 
liberalization of imports will bring a rapid reassignment of resources to exportable goods. The net 
efficiency of the economy would increase due to the exposure of national products to international 
competition which will push import substitution sectors to take advantage of their economies of 
scale and orient themselves towards world markets. Chile's experience nevertheless demonstrates 
that these suppositions were not fulfilled at the start and that the immediate result of an abrupt 
liberalization was the bankrupting of a significant part of the import substitution sector with only a 
small increase in its efficiency and scale of production (Ffrench Davis, 1999). 
Although the ISI strategy has a poor reputation, it served its purpose at the time. Even though 
the industrialization that it generated contained much inefficiency, it left some of the Latin 
American countries, particularly the major ones, with an important manufacturing sector, which in 
some cases has been the basis of the industrialization process that came later and has oriented the 
international competitiveness of these countries (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia). This, however, was 
not the case with Chile, which joined in the indiscriminate liberalization of its economy instead of 
inducing efficiency gains as sectors contracted. 
2. Import substitution industrialization  
Import tariffs have been a major instrument of macroeconomic policy in Chile since the 
world depression and were increased steadily as a central element of the country’s import-
substitution policy, influenced by the views of Raul Prebisch of the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America. This period of import substitution in Chile lasted for more than forty years. It was 
marked by high and differentiated tariffs, exchange controls, import prohibitions and monopolies, 
licenses, lists of permitted imports and previous deposit requirements. These instruments were 
chosen to protect the selected industrial sectors that took the place of exports as the engine of 
growth. Trade policy was also very much affected by immediate concerns such as exchange crises, 
revenue shortfalls, and a stable economy. Yet the trend was always an increase in the trade barriers 
due, in part, to the need to overcome difficulties encountered with the implementation of the import 
substitution policy which grew more sophisticated and costly and in which the country had no 
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Table 1 
EFFECTIVE TAX PROTECTION 
 (percentage) 
Tradable goods sector   1961 1967 1975 1979 
Agriculture and forestry   145 -7 27 10 
Food products   217 365 105 10 
Drinks   164 -23 19 13 
Tobacco   1 -12 68 11 
Textiles   462 492 138 16 
Shoes and wardrobe   318 16 164 14 
Wood and cork   30 -4 93 15 
Furniture   127 -5 58 11 
Paper and other products   49 95 114 17 
Prints and publicity   77 -15 75 12 
Leather & other products  325 18 98 13 
Rubber products   137 304 55 15 
Chemical products   107 64 53 13 
Oil and carbon products   -26 1 140 101 13 
Non metal mine products   179 1 87 14 
Basic Metals   74 35 86 17 
Metallic products   45 92 101 15 
Non electric machinery   73 76 72 13 
Electric machinery   92 449 72 13 
Transport equipment   68 271 n.a. n.a. 
Other manufacturing   129 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
            
Median   107 56 86 13 
Range   488 1 163 145 7 
 Source: Hachette, 2001 
 n.a. not available. 
Between 1950 and 1970 there were three attempts to reduce the barriers (1956,1959 and 
1968) The previous deposit requirements for imports were replaced by equivalent tariffs. Also, the 
tariffs for inputs and capital goods were reduced but this meant that the effective protection for 
some sectors became even greater. The last effort was short lived because the new government in 
1970 was very interventionist. The tariffs lost the few assignment roles that they had had in 
previous years and multiple exchange rates and non-tariff barriers dominated. 
Other liberalization efforts were made to expand the local market and enable it to take 
advantage of economies of scale during the sixties. Chile co-founded the first Acuerdo Latino 
Americano de Libre Comercio (ALALC) with another nine economies and, in 1969, signed the 
Andean Pact that supported in-depth integration efforts within a sub-group of six countries of the 
ALALC (Hachette, 2001). 
By 1973, the average import tariff was around 100%, with individual tariffs that varied 
enormously from 0% to 750%. Many imports were prohibited and the deposit requirements were 
up to 60% although the Central Bank had the capacity to arbitrarily exempt some importers. This 
system restricted development and also gave rise to corruption in the Central Bank in the way that 
foreign currency quotas and import permits were distributed (Hachette, 2001). 
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3. Unilateral liberalization 
The unilateral liberalization of the Chilean economy took place in stages. The first reform 
came about in 1973 with a generalized policy of giving the market the power to govern economic 
decisions. Next, came the second commercial reform that responded to the 1982 recession. Last, 
came the ‘reforms of the reforms’ in the 1990s once Chile had returned to a democracy, and 
followed a strategy of unilateral liberalization in combination with bilateral trade agreements.  
Table 2 shows the evolution of the tariff and exchange rates after the commercial liberation. 
Table 2 
TARIFFS AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES (1973-2003)  
    Year Average Tariff (%) 
Real exchange rate 
(1986 = 100) 
1973 94.00   65.1   
1974-1979 35.30   73.2   
1980-1982 10.10   57.6   
1983-1985 22.70   79.1   
1986-1989 17.60   106.6   
1990-1995 12.00   99.5   
1996-1998 11.00   80.3   
1999-2001 9.00   88.4   
2002-2003 6.00   97.6   
 Source: Ffrench Davis (2002) and Central Bank of Chile 
The commercial policy adopted in 1973 included the elimination of all the non-tariff 
restrictions, an abrupt process of reducing the nominal tariffs on imports, and the unification of the 
exchange rate.  By 1979 there was a uniform tariff on all imports of 10%. Unfortunately, as  
Ffrench-Davis (2002) has pointed out, this abrupt opening of the economy, in a context of an 
exchange rate that was greatly appreciated, combined with a high real interest rate, led to a huge 
external disequilibrium. In order to adjust to this crisis, the policy that was adopted was a series of 
devaluations starting mid 1982 followed by the installation of a crawling peg system for the 
exchange rate.  A second commercial reform was started in 1983 and was a mix of restricted 
liberalization and limited interventions The uniform import tariff was increased in several steps 
until it reached 35% in 1984.  After that, as the external restrictions were reduced and the scarcity 
of foreign currency lessened, the uniform tariff was reduced, also in several steps to 11% by 1991. 
Table 3 shows the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables after the liberalization process.  
When Chile returned to a largely democratic system after 1990, it continued the basic 
principles of the commercial policy that had applied previously together with a new strategy of 
subscribing to free trade agreements, shown in Table 4. The economy continued to maintain a 
uniform tariff that stayed at 11% in the nineties and then has slowly decreased over a period of 
years reaching 6% in 2003. In 2004 the effective tariff (which takes into account preferential trade 
agreements) was below 2%.  On the other hand, during most of the 90’s, the exchange rate system 
used was a crawling peg exchange rate where Central Bank interventions became increasingly 
active. During this period there were large inflows of foreign capital which forced interventions in 
exactly the opposite direction from the 80’s but these policies lost their effectiveness in the second 










CHILE’ S LEADING MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS (1974-1999) 
 Source: Larraín and Vergara (2000), “La transformación económica de Chile”. 
 n.a.: not available. 
1
 Change of methodology in 1992. 
2
 Change of methodology in 1993.  Used as deflator of the CPI corrected by Cortázar and Marshall (1980). 
3
 An increase of this index corresponds to a depreciation of the local currency. 
4
 In 1974-1978 was used CPI corrected by Cortázar and Marshall (1980). 
5
 Defined as export prices of goods and services divided by import prices of goods and services. 
This brought an appreciation of the external rate and, when the Asian crisis arrived, the 
exchange rate lagged. The expectation of a currency devaluation led to a flight of capital with its 
depressionary effects. The Central Bank resisted these pressures through widening the bands and 
increasing the interest rate until September 1999, when it allowed the exchange rate to float. This 
facilitated the correction of the real exchange rate but introduced more volatility.  
 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
1 GDP Growth 1.0 -13.3 3.2 8.3 7.8 7.1 7.7 6.7 -13.4 -3.5 6.1 3.5 5.6
2 Unemployment rate (annual 
average)1 n.d. 14.9 12.7 11.8 14.2 13.6 10.4 11.3 19.6 14.6 13.9 12.0 12.3
3 Formation of gross product of 
fixed capital (%GDP to prices)
18.9 16.7 13.8 15.2 16.5 17.7 20.9 23.2 15.8 13.7 16.3 17.7 17.1
4 Gross national savings (%GDP 
to current prices) n.d. 9.5 16.9 13.8 15.3 16.7 19.3 14.2 4.9 6.9 6.5 7.8 11.5
5 Current account deficit (%GDP)
0.5 6.4 -1.4 3.9 6.8 5.6 7.1 14.5 9.0 5.5 10.8 8.6 6.7
6 Real annual salary growth 2 2.3 -3.4 3.0 10.3 6.3 8.3 8.6 9.0 0.3 -10.9 0.2 -4.5 2.0
7 Real exchange rate (average 
1986=100)3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 57.1 68.1 70.2 60.8 52.9 59.0 70.8 74.0 90.9 100.0
8 Inflation (CPI) (dec-dec)4 369.2 343.3 197.9 84.2 37.2 38.9 31.2 90.5 20.7 23.1 23.0 26.4 17.4
9 Public sector non financial
superavit  (%GDP) -5.4 -2.0 4.0 0.4 1.6 4.8 6.1 0.8 -3.4 -3.0 -4.3 -2.6 -2.1
10 Exchange terms (1986=100)5 225.9 121.4 132.6 122.3 120.9 134.7 132.7 122.3 112.1 114.3 107.6 99.9 100.0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1 GDP Growth 6.6 7.3 10.6 3.7 8.0 12.3 7.0 5.7 10.6 7.4 7.4 3.9 -1.1
2 Unemployment rate (annual 
average)1 11.0 9.9 8.0 7.8 8.2 6.7 6.5 7.8 7.4 6.5 6.1 6.2 9.7
3 Formation of gross product of 
fixed capital (%GDP to prices)
19.6 20.8 24.5 24.2 22.4 24.7 27.2 27.4 30.6 31.0 32.2 32.2 26.9
4 Gross national savings (%GDP 
to current prices) 17.3 22.3 23.3 23.2 22.3 21.5 20.9 21.1 23.8 21.4 21.6 21.2 21.8
5 Current account deficit (%GDP)
3.6 1.0 2.5 1.6 0.3 2.3 5.7 3.1 2.1 5.4 4.9 5.7 0.1
6 Real annual salary growth 2
-0.2 6.5 1.9 1.8 4.9 4.5 3.5 6.5 4.8 5.1 2.4 2.7 2.4
7 Real exchange rate (average 
1986=100)3 104.3 111.2 108.6 112.7 106.4 97.6 96.9 94.2 88.9 84.7 78.2 78.0 82.3
8 Inflation (CPI) (dec-dec)4 21.5 12.7 21.4 27.3 18.7 12.7 12.2 8.9 8.2 6.6 6.0 4.7 2.3
9 Public sector non financial
superavit  (%GDP) -0.2 0.2 1.3 3.6 2.3 2.9 2.1 2.3 3.8 2.0 1.0 -1.3 -2.3





TRADE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNED BY CHILE 
                          Trade agreement Date subscribed 
Economic complementation agreements 
Bolivia (ACE 22) April 6, 1993 
Colombia (ACE 24) December 6, 1993 
Cuba August 21, 1998 
Ecuador (ACE 32) December 20, 1994 
Mercosur (ACE 35) June 25, 1996 
Peru (ACE 38) June 22, 1998 
Venezuela (ACE 23) April 2, 1993 
Free trade agreements 
Canada December 5, 1996 
Centre America April 17, 1998 
South Korea October 24, 2002 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association June 19, 2000 
United States of America June 6, 2003 
Mexico November 9, 2000 
EU: European Union June 21, 1996 
    
Source: www.direcon.cl 
4. External trade 
High growth rates were facilitated by macroeconomic policies that provided continuity in 
business investment and performance. However, the most significant policy affecting the business 
climate was the transformation of the Chilean economy from one of import substitution to one that 
opened up to foreign competition and in which exports and imports played an important role. 
Chile’s degree of openness, expressed as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, 
was 51.4% in 2000, one of the highest in South America and up from 32.2% in 1970 (World Bank, 
2002). Within this openness there was a rapid switch in the balance between exports and imports.  
In 1991, total imports were only 84% of total exports.  By 1998, imports were 107% of exports 
while the combined sum of exports and imports doubled (Silva, 2001).  It should not be forgotten, 
however, that Chile is a relatively small economy in the region and its macroeconomic policies 
must take into account its vulnerability to external shocks due to the high proportion of its GDP 
that depends on trade, both imports and exports.  
 Chile has been very successful in transforming its economy from a closed one to one that 
has opened up substantially and in which exports play a major role.  However, most of these 
exports are primary products.  By the end of the 20th century, Chile’s leading export products were 
copper in various forms, fish, wood pulp, meat and fish meal, wine, grapes, gold and lumber, in that 
order.  These leading products accounted for over 63% of the country’s exports, demonstrating a 
significant concentration of exports in just a few products.  Some 42% of all exports were copper-
based (Macario, 2000) which makes Chile very vulnerable to volatility in copper prices in 
particular. 
ECLAC - SERIE Desarrollo Productivo  N°161    
 15 
As has been observed, the changes that occurred in the Chilean economy during the last three 
decades have been immense and have completely transformed the macroeconomic environment. 
This transition has brought numerous costs and benefits, particularly in manufacturing activities. 
The process had many policy errors, particularly in the first stage. This led manufacturing 
production to contract in absolute terms and its contribution to national GDP to fall from 25% to 
20%. The manufacturing GDP did not regain its absolute 1971 value until 1987, and in per capita 
terms, it was still below its 1971 level in 1991.  This led many firms to bankruptcy (Agosin and 
Ffrench-Davis, 1998). 
Export dynamism was not capable of taking the rest of the economy with it and, in general, 
the GDP growth was meager.  In per-capita terms it expanded at a rate of only 1% a year from 1973 
to 1989. A significant part of the initial growth of manufacturing exports in the second half of the 
70s as well as in the period 1982-1985 was due to the idle capacity that generated the commercial 
and macro policies of the time. When firms were unable to put their products onto the depressed 
national market, they had to resort to selling them on the world market.  A recent study estimates 
that 38% of manufacturing exports in 1975-1977 were due to already installed capacities and were 
not because of new investments (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis, 1998). 
5.  Exchange rates and import tariffs 
Uncertainty concerning macroeconomic policy acts as a disincentive for firms to make 
investment decisions and one of the more important macroeconomic policies is the exchange rate 
policy. Exchange rate stability is something to be aimed at but an overvalued exchange rate in itself 
acts as a barrier to investment if exports and imports play a significant role (Bonelli, 1998) as they 
do in the textile sector in Chile. This has become even more important with trade liberalization and 
the speeding up of the consequences of exchange rate changes (Macario, 2000). Figure 1 shows the 
trend in Chile's real exchange rates in the last quarter of the century.  Between 1989 and 1997 there 
was a considerable appreciation in the real exchange rates at the same time as there was a reduction 
in tariffs and a marked increase in textile imports (See Figure 10).  As we will see later, the main 
markets for textiles and garments were other Latin American countries whose real exchange rates 
also appreciated in 1989-97.  Consequently, Chilean exports to those markets remained 
competitive. 
Figure 1 
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By contrast, if one graphs the trend in textile import tariffs, as shown in Figure 2 below, it 
seems that the rising trend in the relative importance of textile and garment imports at the expense 
of the domestic industries stems in part from the macroeconomic policy of lowering import tariff 
rates in the textile sector. Unlike the case of exchange rates where the broad macroeconomic policy 
operates at a number of steps removed, we are here dealing with an indicator of a highly focused 
macroeconomic policy that can be directly transmitted to the export and import activities of a 
specific sector. It is not the only factor leading to the globalization of textile and garment 
purchases. Low foreign labour costs, for example, play an important role, but it is evident that the 
continuous lowering of import tariff rates has been a major contributing factor.  
Figure 2 
TEXTILE IMPORT TARIFFS 
(Percentage) * 
   Source: Central Bank of Chile.  
   * In the early 1970s the import tariffs were well over 100%  
One the other hand, the very positive overall macroeconomic growth in Chile does not 
appear to have been transmitted to the textile sector perhaps because Chile’s parallel exposure to 
increased competition in the textile sector, made possible by declining import tariffs and the 
accompanying appreciation in real exchange rates, have outweighed the positive effect of general 
economic growth. This is usually the case with small sectors in an economy where the 
macroeconomic policies that count are those directly impinging on the sector. (See Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
VALUE ADDED BY SECTOR 
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III. The textile and garment sectors 
The policy changes that occurred during the last fifty years in 
Chile, discussed in the previous section, have greatly altered its 
macroeconomic environment and have exerted a significant effect 
upon manufacturing activity in general. The effects on the 
manufacturing sector have been magnified by the many policy changes 
concerning the liberalizing of the economy and by the various policy 
errors that have led many firms to bankruptcy, firms that might 
otherwise have survived.  In the this section, the evolution of a meso 
sector is explored and the response of Pollak Industries/Tricot, 
discussed in detail in the next section, is offered as an example of a 
firm that was able to adapt to the changes in the environment in a way 
that made the difference between disappearing or surviving. 
1. The structure and evolution of the textile 
and garment sectors 
We will examine the evolution of the textile and garment 
sectors through an aggregate trend analysis of the evolution of the two 
sectors. Unfortunately, an aggregate analysis does not account for the 
Schumpeterian process of births and deaths of firms, i.e. the changes 
in the composition of the sector, and so it is not possible to understand 
through sector data which firms have died because of their inability to 
compete under the new competitive regime, and which firms have 
survived. We will examine the question about individual firm behavior 
using the Pollak/Tricot case study and the  experience of the literature,  
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which is admittedly  limited in the case of the Chilean textile goods and garment sectors. Three 
major sources of data underpin the sector analyses: Cepal data from the PADI database (Programa 
de Analisis de la Dinámica Industrial); data from the Instituto de Textiles, Sofofa; and Textiles 
Pollak Hnos. firm data. 
The textile and garment sector is made up of a very large number of small firms with the 
great majority having less than 50 employees (See Table 5). Just a few firms have more than 200 
employees and have the resources to use modern technology to respond to the global challenge in 
order to change their product focus and manufacturing processes. This distribution has not changed 
much over the last 20 years even as the total number of firms has declined along with its labour 
force.  In the 1990s, the loss of jobs in the garment sector alone was over 75,000 positions.  
Table 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS IN CHILE’S TEXTILE SECTOR 
CATEGORY 1979 1989 1998 
Total number of firms 945 667 567 
Percentage with less than 50 employees 77.5 64.6 71.1 
Percentage with 50 to 200 employees 17.2 27.3 22.6 
Percentage with more than 200 employees 5.3 8.1 6.3 
Percentage with 500 or more employees (includes Pollak/Tricot) 1.8 2.5 1.2 
Source: Author’s calculation, based on PADI data 
In fact, the number of small firms is even greater than this table suggests because the PADI 
database used in this table does not cover firms with less than 10 employees, of which there are 
many in the textile sector. Pollak is one of the group of less than 10 firms in the sector that 
currently has more than 500 employees. 
2. Employment and salaries  
In this context it is interesting to look at the evolution of employment and salaries in the 
textile and garment sectors. In the 1970s and 1980s, sector salary trends tended to parallel sector 
employment trends. However, from 1991 in the textile sector and from 1995 in the garment sector, 
salaries began to move more independently of sector employment. Even the recent falls in salaries 
have still left salaries way ahead of where they would have been if the pattern of the 1970s and 
1980s had been maintained. In other words, despite the steep fall in sector employment, salaries 
have not fallen proportionately. This is partly due to a general increase in salaries but it is also a 
reflection of the switch to proportionately more skilled workers and fewer unskilled workers, which 
in turn make the sector less cost—competitive. The composition of the textile labor force has 
changed and the Pollak experience exemplifies this. 
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Figure 4 











          
   Source: Author’s calculation, based on the ECLAC PADI database 
Figure 5 












    
Source: Author’s calculation, based on the ECLAC PADI database. 
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, workers have worried that technological 
progress would eliminate their jobs and throw them into the ranks of the unemployed. In early 
nineteenth century England, workers in the textile industry, known as the Luddites, destroyed the 
new machines that they saw as a direct threat to their jobs. In fact, the word saboteur comes from 
one of the ways French workers destroyed machines: by putting their sabots (their heavy wooden 
shoes) into the machinery. The argument for the threat of technological unemployment is that 
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The evidence shows that in the long run the adjustment to technological progress is made 
through increases in output, not increases in unemployment. However, with technological progress 
comes the process of job creation and job destruction, defined by Schumpeter as creative 
destruction. The last 20 years have been characterized by a decline, both relative and absolute, in 
the wages of unskilled workers, to a large extent the legacy of technological progress (Schumpeter, 
1950; Blanchard et a., 2000). 
There is general agreement that the main factor behind the increase in the relative wages of 
skilled versus unskilled workers is a steady increase in the relative demand for skilled workers 
(Blanchard et al, 2000). Since the early 1980s, the relative supply has continued to increase, but not 
fast enough to match the continuing increase in the relative demand. One of the principal factors, if 
not the most important, behind this wage gap is the effect of international trade. High-wage 
unskilled labor in the US and other high-income, high-wage countries is driven out of the market by 
imports from similar firms in low-wage countries. Accordingly, firms in high-wage countries must 
relocate their production to low-wage countries to remain competitive and this pattern holds true 
even in middle income countries like Chile. That two occupations belonging to the textile industry 
are among the ten fastest-declining occupations in the United States (Blanchard, 2000) is testimony 
to the fact that the US textile industry has largely moved to low-wage countries. This has also 
happened in Chile and the experience of Pollak Industries with its upgrading policy and new labor 
profile, discussed in the case study presented later in the paper, bears this out. 
It is interesting to observe the strong connection during the period 1984 to 2002 between the 
overall unemployment rate and the level of employment in the sector and in one of its major firms, 
Pollak, as shown in the three graphs below. The period 1984 to 1990 shows falling national 
unemployment and rising sector and Pollak employment.  The period 1991 to 1998 shows all three 
relatively stable.  The period 1999 to 2002 shows unemployment rising again accompanied by 
falling sector and Pollak employment.  General macroeconomic employment patterns would seem 
to be too broad to have much of an impact on this small sector and, furthermore, the overall sector 
employment figures do not differentiate among skill levels which have changed considerably in 
recent years. 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR 















               Source:  B. Carlson, based on  ECLAC, PADI database 
               
Figure 8 
POLLAK EMPLOYMENT 














              Source: B.Carlson, based on Pollak company data. 
3. Textile and garment exports 
During the import substitution period, successful textile and garment manufacturers were 
able to produce for the domestic market without strong competitive pressures and, consequently, 
firms were not obliged to introduce changes to improve their productivity and quality. The import 
substitution-based model allowed Chile to create and nurture a manufacturing sector and to train 
workers for this sector. However, between the mid 1980s and the late 1990s, Chile, along with most 
of the countries in the region, transformed its macroeconomic and trade policies as well as most of 
its regulatory environment.  These changes have had a considerable effect on the performance of 
firms, altering the framework in which they were used to operating and submitting them to strong 
competition from imports. 
The main motivation for companies to begin exporting was the need to offset the fall in 
demand in the domestic market. The need to find markets for the products that could not longer be 
sold in the domestic market drove firms to export. While an export strategy may have started as a 
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as good business sense – a permanent complement to the firm’s domestic market share. Exporting 
allowed firms to obtain a reliable source of hard currency and decreased their vulnerability to the 
fluctuations in the domestic market. It also provided companies with learning and upgrading 
opportunities.  
To begin exporting, companies had to obtain information and establish a network abroad. 
Exporting exposed firms to international competition and new standards that provided companies 
with significant opportunities to upgrade their performance in order to be able to conform to the 
prevailing standards in the export markets. This learning process led to changes and improvements 
within firms in the course of adapting their production processes to satisfy export market 
requirements. New knowledge, new machinery, and new technology led to a sharp learning curve 
followed by a positive shift in the firm’s production function with a new level of output and 
efficiency (Macario, 2000a). 
Due to the considerable increase in the imports of goods from the far eastern countries, 
especially Chinese garments, the profile of the textile industry has been severely reduced, with a 
few exceptions, leaving mainly the small contractors of specialised products which, because of 
their fashion characteristics, could not be imported because of the standard one-and-a-half years 
lead time for imported garments. The garment industry is a high risk, highly volatile enterprise  The 
strategy, therefore, is to import staples in high volume but produce high fashion garments 
domestically because fashion changes so fast. Small companies can survive and informal labour 
and low investment operations survive depending on how fast fashions change. Department stores 
are major consumers. They import up to 50% of their garments and supplement this with small 
contractors, combining the strategies of faster change and stability, i.e. jeans fashion. Whenever a 
fashion garment becomes a staple then these small companies suffer because they would be 
required  to import a large quantity of sizes and colors. But the small contractor can replenish right 
away which means that the buyer is willing to pay a higher price for local goods, higher than for 
Chinese imports, so the two markets complement each other. 
Chilean exports of textiles and garments began to take off only in the late 1980s and 1986 
was the first year that Chilean exports amounted to more than US$10 million. They rose rapidly to 
US$100 million by 1992, reached US$200 million by 1997, but then began to decline because of 
growing global competition, more favourable trade arrangements among other countries, and the 
large slowdown in trading partnerships within Latin America.  What is interesting about Chile’s 
textile exports is how concentrated they are in a few large companies. In 2001 and 2002, two firms, 
one of which was Pollak Industries, accounted for nearly 30% of total exports. Half the exports 
were accounted for by only six firms and three quarters of the exports were accounted for by only 
17 firms. The many remaining small firms in the textile sector account for only 20% of all exports, 
but their labour force account for at least 80% of the jobs. 
Textile and garment exports, expressed as a percentage of total textile and garment sales, 
increased very slowly and have remained very low, even declining in the mid-1990s, and account 
for only 7% of sales in the garment sector and 13% of sales in the textile sector. By contrast, 
Pollak’s exports, which took off in 1990, account for 50% of its total sales which shows a 
performance that is quite different from the textile sector as a whole, as is shown in Figure 9.  
Pollak is one of the small group of seriously exporting textile companies and accounts by itself for 
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 (percentage) 
SOURCE: author’s calculation based on Instituto Textil and Pollak company data. 
The leading countries to which the Chilean textile and garment sectors export are mainly in 
Latin America. They consist of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela 
in descending order of exports. The only non-Latin American countries in the top ten countries to 
which the Chilean textile and garment sectors exports are USA (8th), Canada (9th), and Italy (10th). 
No single country dominates the textile export market but the first four Latin American importing 
countries are considerably more important than the others.  
4. Textile and garment imports 
Imports into Chile of textiles and garments began to take off much earlier than exports so 
that the US$100 million figure was reached in 1979 and the US$200 million figure was reached in 
1988, about the same time that exports began to take off. The US$400 million figure was quickly 
reached in 1991 and the 2001 figure soared to US$900 million. In contrast to the distribution of 
exports, the distribution of textile imports is much more evenly spread among firms. The top six 
importing firms account for a quarter of the imports; the top 17 firms, including Pollak, account for 
a third and the remaining firms account for two thirds of the imports. 
Textile and garment imports, expressed as a percentage of total textile and garment sales, 
have risen steadily, apart from a sharp decline in the second half of the 1980s, and now account for 
50% of sales in the textile sector and 70% of sales in the garments sector. The imports of Tricot, a 
Pollak Industries subsidiary,  which took off only in 1994 have now reached 44% of Tricot sales. 
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Figure 10  
IMPORTS TO TOTAL SALES 















            
             
               Source: Instituto Textile and Pollak company data. 
The sector import pattern is quite different from the sector export pattern with respect to the 
countries with which the Chilean textile and garment sectors trade. One country, China, completely 
dominates the supply of textile imports. At some US$320 million in 2001, it was equal to the total 
of the next nine leading countries and accounted for more than a third of all textile imports into 
Chile. (In addition, Taiwan (9th) and Hong Kong (12th) account for another US$ 40 million). The 
only other countries to exceed 30 million were USA, Argentina, Brazil, Italy and Pakistan, in 
descending order.  It is worth noting that the Asian countries, including China, accounted for nearly 
US$500 million, some 55% of all textile imports into Chile. 
Although China was a latecomer it has now assumed first place in the growth of East Asian 
trade with Latin America, a growth that has been sustained at a very high annual rate. Chile is now 
one of China’s main trading partners in Latin America and Chilean imports from China increased 
steadily in the 1990s as has happened with many other countries in the region. China is by far the 
largest source of garment and textile imports into Chile and the Chilean textile and garment sectors 
are becoming increasingly uncompetitive in world terms.  
In the globalized economy, Chile suffers from a double disadvantage. Its wages are higher 
than its poorer global competitors, the average labor cost for textile and garment manufacture being 
more than ten times greater than China’s figure of 22 cents per hour. At the same time, its skill 
levels are lower than its richer global competitors and even some of its poorer global competitors 
(Carlson, 2000).  
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IV. The Pollak and Tricot case study 
The typical import-substitution manufacturing firm was a family 
company that was initially set up in a small workshop to produce 
garments, footwear or food products. This small workshop slowly 
expanded, buying new equipment and moving to new premises, and 
became a respectable manufacturing firm (Macario, 2000).  
The Pollak and Tricot case was a successful example of this 
pattern. The transition from small workshop to manufacturing plant 
was often quite risky in the face of competition from many other 
similar workshops. Financial assistance was generally unavailable for 
small firms and few made the transition. Management was generally 
the responsibility of family members and did not follow professional 
criteria. In general, inputs were manufactured within the country in 
view of the prevailing import substitution policies and the costs and 
delays involved in importing from abroad. There was a major 
incentive for firms to become as integrated as possible since 
companies selling intermediate goods were rivals in the finished 
product market. Most goods produced were sold on the domestic 
market. There was little incentive to export because of the high tariffs 
and other barriers in other Latin American countries.  
We will see, however, that as trade barriers fell and global 
competition grew, Pollak changed its production mix from low-skilled 
labor intensive textile production to include garment production and 
direct selling which has in time come to dominate the firm’s 
production, sales and profits. This transition is clearly seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
THE EVOLUTION OF HERMANOS POLLAK S.A. : 1940 s TO DATE 



























A set of four sibling partnerships with 100 employees. 
Four partnerships combined to make one company: Pollak Industries. 
First Tricot retail store opened. 
Tricot merged with Fábrica de Paños Continental. 
Tricot operating eight retail stores in an expanding chain. 
Government takeover. 
Operation returned to the company and the company made responsible for the 
large government debts arising from the crisis.  
Financial  crisis:  Volatile  market   and  flexible   strategy.   Obtained  foreign 
financing; entered the retail market on a large scale via Tricot; reinvested 
profits in the latest equipment and technology; brought new products into the 
market, e.g. Banlon, denim, corduroy, t-shirt printing; held real close-out sales 
to unload end of season goods. 
Financially sound but few clients and employees: Flexible strategy. Purchased 
close-out goods from Hong Kong for quick low-margin sales; bought large-
scale latest foreign equipment and hired technicians; sold uniforms to the 
police and military; started exporting;  supplied large-scale international 
buyers; focused on very light weight expensive worsted wool market and 
men’s wear; used firm`s diversity to spread risk. 
Pollak starts to export. 
Pollak has 2,400 employees. 
Tricot starts to import replacing Pollak domestic production, as tariffs drop. 
Outside professional manager hired and independent directors appointed.  
Pollak has sales of US$ 23 million, 950 employees and exports  are 50% of 
sales. 
Tricot has sales of US$ 70 million, 1,450 employees in 29 stores, 400,000 
credit card customers, and imports are 44% of its sales. 
Factors 1940s to 1060s 1980s 1090s Current 
Number of Pollak 
employees 
100 750-1,600 2,400 950 
Number of Tricot 
employees 
50 .. .. 1,450 
Pollak exports as  
%  of sales 
0% 0% 2% 50% 
Tricot  imports as 
% of sales 
0% 0% 8% 44% 
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Pollak’s history has been extremely volatile from a humble start of 100 employees in the 1940’s 
up to 1,700 by 1981, down to 760 in 1983, back again to 2,400 by 1992 and just under 1,000 today. 
Its sales similarly fluctuated and were reported at 23 million US dollars for 2001, half of which 
consisted of exports. All this took place in the manufacturing area and the volatility of the textile 
market was obvious. To protect itself against this problem, Pollak created a retail chain in the mid-
50’s named Tricot, S.A. for the purpose of selling most of their knitted garments. In 2002, Tricot 
had 1,450 employees, 29 stores, and sales of approximately 70 million dollars, from selling a full 
range of garments made in Chile and imported from different countries. 
 
1.  The early days 
The company originated in the consolidation in 1952 of four partnerships that were started 
by the Pollak brothers and their in-laws who came from Rumania in 1947-1949.  Each partner 
contributed his specialized knowledge. One was a weaver, another a knitter, another an 
administrator and another a salesman.  They sold their knits and fabrics on the wholesale market 
with whatever raw materials they could get. They realized that the provider of their raw materials 
was making most of the profits so, having a critical mass, they went ahead to build a spinning plant 
to satisfy their needs. This reactive behavior to market openings  rather than the result of proactive 
long term strategies was the pattern of their growth and development. 
The Chilean government in the 1960’s was a major economic player. It controlled currency 
exchange, and it maintained high tariffs. Due to the lack of monetary reserves, it used different 
means to restrict imports such as “bonos-dolares” (documents rented and deposited at the Central 
Bank for purposes of importing) and “depositos previos”(sums of money equivalent to 200 or 
300% of the c.i.f. value of the goods which had to be deposited with the banks for over 120 days).  
It was a period of high inflation because of high demand and lack of  products and services. 
Manufacturers practically had a monopolistic situation. Many productively inefficient 
manufacturing concerns sprung up because of the lack of competition. There was a large migration 
of the population from the countryside because of the lack of opportunities and from 1960 to the 
beginning of the 1990s, the percentage of Chile's population living in metropolitan Santiago rose 
from 29% to 40%. 
The 1950’s and the 1960’s showed most  growth in most of the divisions of the company.  
The knitting division serves as an example of this.   Once it opened itself to the retail market and 
realized its profitability, it expanded in that period from one to eight stores.  Two other features 
accounted for the division’s success at the time. It reinvested most of its profits in the latest 
technology as well as having an aggressive marketing policy, copying new products as they became 
available in the international market and introducing them into the Chilean market. One such case 
was the introduction of ladies’ garments made out of Banlon, a nylon yarn manufactured under a 
US license that gave the garment a soft and voluminous touch. Another feature of its marketing 
strategy was characterized by copying the US market’s behavior of real close-out sales for the 
purpose of unloading end of season products.  
The combination of all these strategies allowed the division to work year round which was 
atypical in the sector and the division reached a production level of 50,000 garments per month.  
The woolen division (tweeds, cashmere, and flannels) became very competitive in the same period 
because of its spinning mill and its capacity to recycle the cuttings of the knitting division. The 
only stage that this division was missing in order to be totally independent from contractors was the 
finishing and sponging of the fabrics.  In the second half of the 1960’s, a finishing and sponging 
plant was brought from abroad, making the division totally vertical. 
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The two combined divisions, organized as they were, made for a very efficient financial  
organization.  The cash sales of the knitting division through its retail outlets financed the long 
term cycle of the wholesale sales of over 150 days of the woolen division.  To complete its total 
verticality, the company invested in 1967 in a worsted spinning mill for the knitting division. 
Parallel to Textiles Pollak, there was another  company, Fabrica de Paños Continental, S.A. 
which manufactured worsted fabrics (palm beach, gabardine, cashmere). It consisted of a worsted 
spinning plant and approximately 50 looms. It sold its products directly to the wholesale market 
and had to finance a 120 day production cycle and a 180 sale cycle.  It was always short of cash and 
depended on financing by the banks which was not the case with Pollak Hermanos because of its 
retail outlets. At the beginning of the 60’s, the shareholders of  Pollak and Continental exchanged 
shares, for all practical purposes turning the two companies into one company, although the 
accounts were kept separately.   
2. The 1970s and 1980s 
The outcome of the 1970 elections was traumatic the company.  The first day after the 
election, the families left Chile, leaving the companies in the hands of professional managers. The 
families had kept themselves free of any political involvement and identification with any political 
movement since their arrival in Chile. Their departure from Chile was understood by the 
government as one of safeguarding their security, after having undergone great hardships after the 
second world war which had brought them to Chile in the first place. They were invited many times 
to come back to the country. They were probably the only company of that size that reached an 
agreement of “usofructo” with the CORFO. In this agreement, the shareholders kept title and the 
CORFO became responsible for the profit and loss situation. The companies were taken over in 
October of 1972 and returned to their rightful owners in January, 1974. However, the new military 
government did not recognize the "usofructo" agreement and the shareholders became liable for the 
losses incurred by the earlier government takeover. 
At that point the company was in a bad financial state having no inventories and incurring a 
tremendous debt with the national banking system.  Through the combination of capital increases, 
foreign financing, and the cash sales of Tricot, the company slowly moved towards a sound 
financial footing. All kinds of projects were implemented to try to make the company solvent.  
Among them were the weaving of denim, the import  and installation of a corduroy manufacturing 
plant, and the production of transfer printing t-shirts.  By 1982, the jeans factory dropped from 160 
to 60 employees and the factory started making work clothes. All these projects lasted a very short 
time. They were not in the tradition of what the company manufactured.  Nevertheless, they served 
their purpose and helped to keep the company afloat.  The situation was not helped by the high 
interest rates and high inflation.  Eventually, in the late 1970s, when the country as a whole started 
recuperating, so did the different divisions. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind, that practically 
15 years had gone by and the company’s machinery and technology had not been brought up to 
date. 
The crisis of 1982 found the company in a relatively sound financial situation but with no 
clients to whom to sell fabrics to make profits.  They were faced with the need to drastically reduce 
expenses as well as reducing manpower.  One of the cost-saving measures was for Pollak 
Hermanos to absorb Continental to avoid duplicating services.  The combined company accounted 
for over 1,600 employees in 1981 but, by 1983, employment was down to 750.  The necessary 
funds to pay the large amount of severance pay while keeping the company afloat was obtained by 
means by purchasing  US$3 million of close-out goods from Hong Kong, selling them fast at a low 
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margin through Tricot and using the profits to pay off the employees and finance the operation of 
the company. 
As there was no market for the fabrics, it was decided to start a garment manufacturing 
division and sell the fabrics as garments through Tricot. They were also encouraged by several 
representatives of the Armed Forces to do this because there were no acceptable manufacturers of 
uniforms. With the use of European consultants, they acquired a turn-key project consisting of a 
garment manufacturing plant from Germany capable of manufacturing men’s suits on a large scale.  
Not being familiar with this end of the textile business, they engaged the services of foreign 
technicians to run the plants and hired qualified labour from other garment plants that had gone 
bankrupt.  Pollak, which was the prime supplier of fabrics to the Chilean police force (through 
public bids) also now became the supplier of uniforms. Three quarters of the fabric was turned into 
uniforms and sold to the police force and the remaining quarter was used to make garments to 
supply the Tricot business to be sold slowly to supply retain chains. This strategy led to a demand 
for new labour for the garment plant. This worked out well for several years until another vendor 
won the police contract by importing the uniforms from China, leaving Tricot as only an outlet for 
garments. However, Tricot stores were too small for the new volume. Consequently the garment 
factory increased its employees and this gave birth to the garment division that was later called, 
“Confecciones Bagir”. 
At the same time at the end of 1982 they acquired electronic knitting machines, through 
foreign credits, to replace the obsolete ones which were limited in design capability with low 
productivity. The arrival of the electronic knitting machines involved changing personnel. A small 
number of more qualified, electronically skilled technicians were required to run and maintain the 
machines but, at the same time, less qualified workers were needed to use the machines. The cost 
of a standard industrial knitting machine had risen from US$ 750, capable of producing 300 darts 
per day, to a more sophisticated version of that same machine costing US$ 2,500, but capable of 
producing 1,200 darts per day. The state of the art machine cost US$ 150,000. The cheap machines 
had low productivity and required a qualified person while the state of the art machine ran itself, 
needing unqualified operators and a few key technicians to maintain them. The productivity 
increment was almost 20 fold. 
These entrepreneurial decisions, which might be considered risky in the light of the 
economic conditions at the time, were ones that paid off and allowed the company to overcome the 
financial difficulties of the country and survive when approximately 70% of the garment and textile 
industry went bankrupt.  The reason for the survival of Pollak was not its size nor just its efficiency 
but was because of its diversification. One or another division would always carry the rest of the 
firm. This was not the case with most textile firms in Chile which were forced out of business. 
Among the major firms which were forced out of business in the fabric area were Rayonil, Hirmas 
S.A., Yarur S.A., and Pichara S.A. In the garments area the major firms that went under were 
Burger, Heyum, Buffalo and Vestex. 
3. The main operating divisions 
In analyzing an economy it is difficult to avoid blurring the differences among its sectors. In 
analyzing a sector it is difficult to avoid blurring the differences among its firms, particularly in 
such a disparate sector as the textile and garment sector. Similarly, in analyzing a single firm like 
Pollak it is important where possible to differentiate among its separate divisions, especially 
because the firm’s diversification has been essential to its survival. A brief description of the 
history and practices of  its main divisions illustrates the different impacts of global trends on the 
behavior of the divisions. 
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The worsted and woolen division has an installed capacity of 120,000 to 150,000 meters 
today compared to 50,000 meters in the 1960s, using advanced technology, and produced strictly 
for the local market until the mid 1980s. As a consequence of the 1982-83 crisis, most garment 
manufacturing went bankrupt and the division started looking for markets elsewhere in order to 
keep producing sufficient yardage to stay competitive. The division had established contacts with 
two US agents and, with their assistance and know-how, developed fabrics suitable for the US 
market. At the same time it also produced fabrics for the parent firm both for products to be sold 
locally and other export markets. This division really exists for the export market and could just as 
well have its design and management personnel located in New York.  
The reason for this division’s survival is that fashion in the US has changed and there has 
been a big increase in the demand for very light weight worsted fabric made out of expensive 
wools. This is almost trabajo artisanal "roll-by-roll" production by very qualified personnel and 
entails a high degree of quality control. The contracts contain large indemnity clauses for non-
performance be it quality, time or non-delivery. On the other hand, the purely woolen part of the 
Division has closed down because fashion has changed and tweeds and other heavy weight fabrics 
are not consumed anymore. This involved the firing of 75 people in 2000 who had  accounted for 
40% of the Division’s sales at the time although this drop in sales has since been partly 
compensated by the increase in the sales of worsted fabrics to the United States. Italian companies 
are the main competitors but they can still sell for US$12 per yard while Pollak can sell for only 
US$7 per yard, due to the prestige of Italy's high quality textiles. Now the TLC with the US has 
been signed, Pollak will be more competitive in its pricing, as it had been  previously subject to a 
duty of  27%.  
The hand and industrial knitting yarn division was producing 150 tons per month in 1967, 
with 85% of the output sold wholesale and the remaining 15% allocated to interdivisional 
consumption. However, when the TLC with Mexico was signed, an additional competitor was 
introduced into the market. Mexico had two strengths: a) comparatively low labour costs, US$125 
per month, instead of US$500 per month for Chile in 1998, and b) its companies have economies of 
scale. All the spindles in Chilean would fit into one Mexican acrylic spinning plant.  Mexico’s 
transport costs are also lower as Mexico’s container costs are half Chile’s shipping costs. This 
great difference has forced down international competitive prices substantially, causing many 
Chilean firms to go bankrupt because of insufficient margins.  
The spinning division started to import yarn from Turkey to produce a  lower average 
selling price. It then improved its service to clients and moved up in the market by introducing 
‘fancy yarns’. Even with these steps, it had to reduce its production to 100 tons per month because 
there was practically no market any more, representing a lay-off of about 85 people as a 
consequence of the competition with TLC protected Mexico. If it survives, this will be only 
because the TLC between Chile and USA has been signed. 
The vacuum in the sector that had been created by the companies that had disappeared was 
taken advantage of by Pollak Industries to bring the garment plant to maturity, and the original 
number of 120 employees had risen to approximately 600 during the second half of the 1980s. It 
was also necessary to invest in electronic design and pattern making equipment as well as 
computerized controlled cutting devices. At the same time, the garment division , which already 
had seven men’s boutiques named Bagir, took on contracts with Liz Claiborne, the second biggest 
women’s wear concern in the United States. 
The relationship between Liz Claiborne and Pollak Industries became a very close one and 
lasted approximately seven years in which not only did the division produce CMT (cut, make, and 
trim) but Liz Claiborne bought finished garments with fabric manufactured by the fabric division.  
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The large quantities per design and color allowed for high efficiency and required the renewal of 
most of the weaving plant which was obsolete at the time and was in no condition to manufacture 
export quality fabrics. The partnership between Liz Claiborne and Pollak Industries lasted until 
1995 when the firm could no longer compete with the cheaper Central American wages, despite 
good personal relationships, and this is now happening with the industrial knitting division. 
The fabric division had shrunk to 450 employees in 1997 but was able to open markets in 
Mexico and Canada because of the free trade agreements. Margins dropped by 10-15% because the 
men’s wear market is far more competitive than the women’s market. Pollak has been exporting to 
Mexico and Canada, taking advantage of its TLC agreements, and to the US via Brooks Brothers 
because of that firm’s reputation for high quality and reliability. Exports now consist exclusively of 
men’s wear because the available products in the women’s market are such that Pollak cannot be 
competitive. Women’s clothes are easier to manufacture and require less technology and so there is 
much more competition with the Pollak products. 
4. Recent developments 
The beginning of the 1990s were extremely profitable years for the company. Because of the 
end of the relationship with Liz Claiborne, a decision was made to sell the excess men’s wear 
through Tricot. The number of stores were increased and the square meters per store average was 
increased to accommodate the new inventory. Because of this new strategic decision, Tricot, which 
was a limited partnership, became a corporation and its capital was increased to handle the increase 
in inventory and sales. This idea worked well for approximately three years until it became clear 
that the clientele of the Tricot stores were mainly in the C2, C3, and D1 socio-economic categories 
and were not clients for suits. An independent professional management at Tricot decided to 
replace the space with goods bought in the local market as well as to explore importing goods from 
the Far East. 
The influx of goods from China in the second half of the 1990’s, referred to earlier in the 
paper, was a big blow to the local textile and garment manufacturing industry. At Pollak Industries, 
the first division to suffer was the knitting division which for a long time had been the biggest 
profit maker. Even with the latest technology, it could not compete with the low price of Chinese 
knits. Today the knitting division has only 30 employees, down from a high of 350. It produces 
teenage fashion wear which is managed by sub-contractors and sold to big department stores.  
After Tricot recognized that it lacked the right clients, the garment division had to look 
elsewhere to place its production capacity. Today, it produces strictly men’s wear for export to 
Mexico, Canada, and USA. This is a very competitive situation because of the high cost of Chilean 
labour and the slow-down of the world economy. The fabric division, on the other hand, having 
learned to produce export-quality goods for Liz Claiborne, acquired the services of two selling 
houses and was able to maintain productivity by exporting high fashion fabrics of very fine yarns, 
requiring a lot of specialist labour and high quality control. 
In early 2001, the shareholders of the company decided to change its managerial structure 
from a family managed company to a non-family run company. It was decided that some very 
strong measures would have to be taken which only outside managers and independent directors 
could carry out. The new management decided on a policy, approved by the Board of Directors, to 
keep only the profitable divisions and those viable in the future. The company now has 950 
employees and its sales have dropped by a third. The future for the textile industry as a whole looks 
gloomy but the Free Trade Agreement with the United States which was signed last year may make 
the future more favourable. 
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The irony of this manufacturing company is that the child it gave birth to, its marketing arm, 
today has twice the amount of sales as its parent company. It has grown to a chain of 29 stores and 
1,450 employees.  It stays financially profitable by importing large quantities of Chinese goods and 
having over 400,000 credit card customers. Tricot has grown and become independent and lowered 
its consumption of knitted goods. It has reached a point where even though Textiles Pollak 
Hermanos S.A. has a knitting division, Tricot’s product managers travel to China to buy knitted 
goods at one third of the cost of making them in-house. Figures 11 and 12 show the complete 
change of purchasing and importing policy that had to be adopted by Tricot because of changes in 
macroeconomic and trade policies. 
Figure 11 

































        
  Source: Author’s calculations based on Tricot company data. 
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V. Conclusion  
It is important for economic policy makers and the business 
community to have a better understanding of the interactions between 
the macroeconomic environment and the microeconomic structure. In 
the last 30 years, Chile has undergone a major macroeconomic 
transformation that has completely altered the economy at the 
microeconomic level, and it was thought that Chile would make a very 
suitable patient for a detailed examination of the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on the sector and firm performance in the 
textile and garment industry. In particular, the paper has analyzed the 
evolution (life cycle) of a leading textile firm and the entrepreneurial 
decisions that it had to make in response to the changing 
macroeconomic and policy environment and the overall impact of 
globalization. 
With this objective, the paper examined a number of indicators 
of macroeconomic policy to try to assess the impact of these policy 
changes on the performance of Chile’s textile and garment sectors as 
well as on this leading firm. The macroeconomic policy indicators that 
were selected were: GDP growth; unemployment; exchange rates; 
wages; and import tariffs, all of which might be expected to affect 
sector and firm performance. There appears to be a clear connection 
between the observed trends in unemployment and exchange rates and 
sector or firm overall performance. It might be though difficult to 
show conclusively a causal relationship between a basic across-the-
board macroeconomic policy and the performance of a small sector, 
like textiles and garments, where other more immediate factors might  
have had a more direct impact.  
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However, in the case of the fifth macroeconomic policy, trade liberalization and import 
tariffs, there is a very powerful causal connection. The paper shows that the growing importance of 
textile and garment imports at the expense of domestic manufacturing was a consequence of the 
opening of the economy through the lowering of import tariff rates. 
With the lowering of import tariffs, firms in the textile and garment sectors increasingly 
found themselves unable to compete with other textile and garment producing low-cost countries. It 
was observed that these sectors consisted of a very large number of small firms, the great majority 
with less than 50 employees. Only a few large firms had the know-how and resources to make use 
of modern technology to respond to the global challenge and change their firm strategy, product 
focus and manufacturing processes accordingly. At the same time, despite the steep fall in sector 
employment, sector salaries did not fall proportionately, in part reflecting a switch to 
proportionately more skilled workers and fewer unskilled workers. Furthermore, we have seen that 
Chilean textile imports are very concentrated among a very few countries. China, a very low-cost 
country, completely dominates textile imports, accounting for more than one third of them, while 
the Asian countries as a whole account for more than half. 
The last part of the paper is a case study of a leading firm in the textile and garment sector, 
Textiles Pollak Hermanos S.A. and its retail subsidiary, Tricot. Textiles Pollak is the second largest 
textile exporter in Chile and, with Tricot, its tenth largest textile importer. In its origin, Pollak was 
typical of family-organized textile sector firms but, although declining like the rest of the textile 
sector and then facing serious problems of excess capacity, it remains one of the few competitive 
textile firms, with exports accounting for half its sales and 10% of the exports of the entire sector. 
Pollak has survived whereas most of the leading textile firms have been forced out of business.  
The firm’s ability to survive in a progressively declining sector was because of its vertical 
integration and diversification and its willingness to adapt to new production methods and product 
innovations as market conditions changed, adaptations that the paper describes in detail. Today, in 
an open global economy, vertical integration has become less feasible because the textile market 
requires specialized manufacturing concerns that produce at a competitive price and for a very 
specific market. This requires economies of scale that the Pollak manufacturing divisions have 
never had. The recent signing of the Free Trade Agreements with the United States and the 
European Union are favourable steps in the current Chilean commercial policy for the survival of 
these and similar firms but they may well be overshadowed by the forthcoming elimination of all 
textile and garment import quotas which is scheduled to come into effect in January 2005, as 
agreed ten years ago when the Multi Fiber Agreement on Textiles (MFTA) was drawn up.  
Currently, the Latin American region accounts for 26% of US imports in this sector, with 
Mexico accounting for 10%. The WTO estimates that, with the elimination of MFTA quotas, the 
Latin American region will soon account for only 8% of US imports, with Mexico accounting for 
5%. By contrast, China and Hong Kong which currently account for 25% of US imports will soon 
account for 50% of those imports because of their efficient large-scale production and low costs. 
The best way of dealing with the new rules of the game when competing for part of the global 
textile and garment trade, currently valued at over US$350 billion annually, is the strategy that 
Pollak has successfully taken –focusing on high quality and speed. But that may not be enough.  
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